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Abstract—Safety and security is a major concern that needs at-
tention in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones.
The failure to ensure high standards of security will inevitably
result in the endangerment of people and property. Crafting
such security measures is heavily dependent on the hardware
and software control capabilities of drones. In a drone mission,
arming involves controlling drone motors and plays a critical part
in its flight. Unauthorized arming is a major security challenge
associated with drones. To this end, a Randomized Logistic map
based Time-dependent One Time Password (Randomized LTOTP)
algorithm as a mechanism of authenticating the drone-arming
procedure is proposed. In addition, unintended flight termination
is a potential safety threat that needs to be mitigated in any
drone application. Existing systems trigger drone landing as soon
as they detect low battery levels. This often results in hazardous
and spontaneous landing conditions. As an attempt to mitigate
this issue, a Flag based Battery Fail-Safe (FBFS) algorithm is
proposed to monitor in-flight battery levels and safeguards the
landing by prolonging the mission until the landing is safe. The
simulation results show that the Randomized LTOTP algorithm
achieves 92% randomness, which improves the security of the
arming process, and FBFS improves the flight time approximately
by 3-fold compared with the existing algorithm.
Index Terms—UAV Arming, OTP Authentication, Fail-Safe
System, Authorized Arming, Safeguarded Landing
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) promises a wide range
of applications such as military, agriculture, rescue operation,
inventory, and in most of the commercial fields [1]. The global
commercial drone market is expected to reach about 13.37
billion US dollars by the end of 2025 [2]. UAVs share plenty
of sensible data like telemetry and telecommand data with the
ground control station. Thus, UAVs are the potential targets in
which an adversary can harm the UAV or access the data it
contains. Moreover, UAVs are vulnerable to attacks, as they
communicate through a wireless network. Thus, security is
always an issue in UAV networks [3]. It is critical to secure
the data present in UAV when it is in motion. Therefore,
safeguarding UAVs from unapproved access and interruption
is indispensable for UAVs’ future advancement, which can
be achieved through authentication [4], [5]. Moreover, if a
significant defense mechanism like authentication fails, all
other security measures become redundant, placing the entire
UAV mission under threat [6].
The existing security systems use client authentication and
data origin authentication but have drawbacks due to their
symmetric nature. Furthermore, existing mechanisms provide
authentication only to pre-decided legitimate users who have
a secret key but are incapable of providing non-repudiation
[7]. Non-repudiation is a security assurance to ensure that a
sending communication entity cannot deny the origin of its
message. The specified challenges can be resolved by using
One Time Password (OTP) based authentication mechanisms
such as chaotic map based OTP [8] and Time-based OTP
(TOTP) [9], [10]. Unlike conventional static passwords that
are valid for a long time, OTPs are dynamic and restricted for
one-time use, making OTP-based authentication desirable for
primary security mechanisms.
Besides security, safety is another important aspect of drone
navigation. A drone’s flight safety majorly depends on its
battery life and confined flight time, making these factors
significantly challenging to handle. Limited battery life shortens
drone flight duration, causing drones to return to their ground
control stations for recharge. This may prolong the actual
mission completion and, therefore, unsuitable for time-critical
missions. For lithium batteries, the battery capacity is limited
and cannot be recharged easily [11]. Hence, currently Elec-
tronic Fuel Injection (EFI) engines are preferred as they provide
about 25% fuel saving [12]. Unmanned air crafts require a
software-driven framework to handle battery failure issues and
provide enhanced safety.
The contributions towards enhancing the authenticated arm-
ing and battery fail-safe mechanisms are as follows:
• The Randomized LTOTP is generated by performing an
eXclusive OR (XOR) operation with a chaotic map-based
random number and TOTP value. The proposed mecha-
nism improves the randomness of OTP, thereby enhancing
security.
• A Flag based Battery Fail-Safe (FBFS) mechanism is
proposed to trigger the safe landing of drone only if the
battery has not recovered after going below a threshold
value for more than 3 times. Thus, FBFS prevents unsafe
landing and increases the span or lifetime of the drone
mission.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, literature
related to UAV safety and security is discussed. In Section
III, the proposed LTOTP is discussed in detail with necessary
preliminaries. In Section IV, the proposed fail-safe system is
elaborated. In Section V, the simulation results are presented
and discussed. The work is concluded in Section VI, highlight-
ing the results achieved.
II. RELATED WORK
Various literature related to security and fail-safe mecha-
nisms of UAVs are studied in detail and presented as follows:
Authentication is the primary security measure for many
systems, which is achieved using encryption techniques, OTP,
and so on. In [13], the TOTP generation algorithm is used
for securing the Wi-Fi network. But the limitation of the
design is that the user needs to generate TOTPs periodically
to maintain the server link. Alternatively, [14] uses the OTP
authentication mechanism based on the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) and a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG).
As AES performs 128 rounds of operations to generate a secret
key, this mechanism increases the security establishment time
and complexity.
To provide mutual authentication between the mobile termi-
nal and the server, [15] uses a secure cross-layer authentication
scheme by combining radio frequency fingerprinting with OTP.
However, this method increases the authentication execution
time, resulting in a decrease of transaction speed. A TOTP
authentication via Secure Tunnel (TOAST) is used as an au-
thentication scheme in [10]. TOAST is a mobile app that stores
the seed value on mobile phones using a protective password
key obtained from the server over a protective Transport Layer
Security (TLS) tunnel and uses it to create OTP.
OTPs have also been employed in recent platforms such
as those of cryptocurrency and blockchain. A secret key
based TOTP generation is used as a security mechanism for
cryptocurrency [16]. However, the use of same secret key
throughout the session degrades the effectiveness of OTP. A
two-factor authentication scheme based on TOTP is used in [9]
for hyperledger fabric blockchain. Logistic maps can also be
used to generate OTP [17]. In contrast to a normal logistic map,
enhanced logistic maps have more randomness and chaotic
performances [18]. A robust wireless network authentication
for passengers at high-speed train is proposed in [8], which
uses 2 chaotic maps to calculate OTP and improve security.
In addition to security, UAV’s safety plays a vital role in
many drone applications. Fail-safe mechanisms are the primary
measure to ensure safety in drone missions. There are various
fail-safe mechanisms in a drone like maintaining stability,
battery monitoring, fault detecting, etc. A fail-safe system
proposed in [19] activates an emergency parachute when the
UAV is unable to maintain a stable flight. Servo actuator’s
failure may result in the loss of UAV controlling mechanism,
which can lead to potential safety issues. In [20], a low-cost
fault detection and fail-safe system are designed for detecting
servo actuators breakdowns in mini-UAV.
Thus, in order to enhance the efficiency of the existing OTP
mechanisms, the proposed Randomized LTOTP increases the
randomness of the OTP using a logistic-chaotic map and Linear
Congruential Generator (LCG). Additionally, the existing bat-
tery fail-safe is enhanced by the proposed FBFS mechanism by
extending the flight time at low battery levels and preventing
unsafe landing.
III. RANDOMIZED LOGISTIC MAP BASED TOTP
Drone arming gives the operator full control over the drone
and plays a significant role in UAV operations. Thus, the lack
of security in this process can result in unauthorized arming
and leads to misuse, crashing, stealing, etc. of drone and its
data. In real drone flight scenarios, arming is done using the
arming switch. The arming alert is turned on as soon as the
switch is pressed. The arming alert is merely an indication
of ongoing arming and signals user to stay away from the
drone, as it may take off at any moment. However, arming
alert does not guarantee successful drone arming. Hence, the
proposed Randomized Logistic map based TOTP (Randomized
LTOTP) authentication not only offers authorized arming but
also confirms successful arming of the drone.
In the Randomized LTOTP algorithm, a random number
generated using Logistic Chaotic-map based Random Number
Generation (LCRNG) is XORed with a hash-based TOTP.
Then the XOR value is shuffled using LCG to further in-
crease randomness in OTP generation. The logistic chaotic map
helps in improving OTP randomness; and TOTP authentication
guarantees that OTP is valid only for 30 seconds, as it time-
bounded. The Randomized LTOTP based on LCRNG, TOTP
and LCG algorithms are discussed as follows.
A. Logistic chaotic-map based Random Number Generation
A chaotic map is a discrete map that depends on initial
conditions and exhibits chaotic behaviour. Logistic map is a
chaotic map and its randomness arise from very simple non-
linear dynamical equations. Logistic map describes how the
variable changes with time. In particular, the future value
depends on the current value and a parameter (r). Therefore, it
can be considered as a model for a time-varying system [18].
Randomized LTOTP uses a LCRNG algorithm to generate the
initial random number, which is further processed with TOTP
and shuffled using LCG.
A chaotic map is a function f : S → S where S is the
sample space of function f and its expected outcome set is
O = {O1, O2, . . . . . . , Ok}, where k is the number of possible
outputs. Mathematically, logistic map is represented as f(x) =
xn+1 = rxn(1− xn), where r is the parameter that controls
the chaotic behaviour and xn is the previous point in the map
with x0 as the initial point.
A partition of S has to be calculated to find the boundaries
of the map. Let the partition be λ, and λ = {λ1, λ2...., λk }
and λ must meet the following condition
∪i=ki=1λi = S
∀λi, λj ∈ λ : λi ∩ λj = φ
∀λi, λj ∈ λ : P [f(x) = λi] = P [f(x) = λj]
(1)
Algorithm 1 Logistic Chaotic-map based RNG
Input: Chaotic maps f1 and f2, initial states x0 and y0,
number of OTP digits: n
Output: n-bit binary random number(R)
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: xi = f1(xi) = rxi−1(1− xi−1)
3: yi = f2(yi) = ryi−1(1− yi−1)
4: bits = max(xi, yi)
5: if bits > 0.5 then
6: Oi = 1
7: else
8: Oi = 0
9: end if
10: end for
11: Return n-bit binary random number (R)
The conditions for λ are explained as follows: i) when a
union of all partition is performed, the sample space S must
be obtained. ii) the partitions must be distinct and iii) the
probability of f(x) lying in the partition λi must be equal
to that of λj .
The boundary value between λ1 and λ2 which satisfies (1)
must be calculated. Calculation of boundary is crucial as it
prevents the death of chaotic property due to boundary crisis.
At boundary crisis, maximum value of 1 is reached by the map
and chaotic property disappears.
However, we cannot obtain boundaries in S with the finite
iteration results, since the boundaries change over the iterations
[8]. To avoid this calculation overhead, Randomized LTOTP
uses two logistic maps f1 : S → S and f2 : S → S with initial
states x0, y0 and same r (r = 4) value. Their outputs can be
determined in each iteration as xi = f1(xi) and yi = f2(yi),
where
f1(xi) = rxi−1(1− xi−1) (2)
f2(yi) = ryi−1(1− yi−1) (3)
The binary output of an iteration for the random number
generation can be determined by
Oi =
{
xi, xi > yi
yi, xi < yi
(4)
The randomness of logistic map can be proved mathemati-
cally by simply proving that P [O = xi] = P [O = yi] =
0.5, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let us consider that for both maps f1 and
f2, their partitions are α = { α1,...,αk} and β = {β1,...,βk}
respectively. According to (1), ∀αi, βj P [f(x) = αi] =




As f1 and f2 have same r value (r=4) and same number of
iterations, the corresponding xi and yi are independent and fall
in different regions [8]. Then the probability of getting xi is





P [f1(xi) ∈ αl1 ]
k∑
l2=l1+1
P [f2(xi) ∈ βl2 ] (5)
= limk→∞ k−12k = 0.5
Similarly, the probability of getting yi is





P [f1(xi) ∈ αl1 ]
l2−1∑
l2=1
P [f2(xi) ∈ βl2 ] (6)
= limk→∞ k−12k = 0.5
Therefore, from (5) and (6), the randomness of logistic
map is proved. The random number generation process using
LCRNG is described in Algorithm 1. LCRNG considers 2
logistic chaotic maps f1 and f2 and its initial states x0 and y0
as input. The generated output (R) is a n-bit binary number. In
step 1, LCRNG iterates for n times to generate a n-bit random
number. In every iteration, 2 values xi and yi using f1 and
f2 are obtained. The maximum value of xi and yi is taken to
decide the bit. If the maximum value is greater than 0.5 then
bit is 1, otherwise 0.
B. Time-Based OTP
TOTPs are generated based on the uniqueness of the current
time. It is an extension of Hash based Message Authentication
Code (HMAC)-OTP (HOTP), in which a non-decreasing value
based on the current time is used. TOTP mechanism is often
used in many applications for increased security [9]. To gen-
erate TOTP in Randomized LTOTP, the drone and user must
pre-establish the security parameters T0, TX and secret key K.








where Tx , T and T0 represents the number of duration count,
unix time and epoch respectively. After calculating CT from
(7), the HOTP value is calculated. The HOTP value is a d-digit
decimal value calculated using (9)
TOTP value(K) = HOTP value(K, CT ) (8)
HOTP value(K, CT ) = HOTP (K, CT ) mod 10
d (9)
where d is length of OTP
HOTP (K, CT ) = truncate(HMACH(K, CT )) (10)
Thus, HOTP is a truncation of the HMAC of the counter CT
with the secret key K, and an hash function H . The truncation
takes the 4 least significant bits of the MAC and uses them as
an offset, i, which is further used to select 31 bits from MAC,
starting at bit i + 1. The truncated HOTP value from (10) is
used in (8) to calculate the TOTP.
Algorithm 2 Randomized Logistic map based TOTP
Input: n-bit binary random number (R) from LCRNG and
TOTP
Output:OTP for arming authentication
1: n = 4*d
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: a = rand()
4: c = rand()
5: Xi = (aXi−1 + c) mod m
6: nbit[i] = R[Xi]
7: end for
8: for i = 1; i < n; i = i + 4 do
9: digit = Binary-to-integer(nbit[i:i+4])
10: digit = to-string(digit)
11: OTP = OTP + digit
12: end for
13: Send OTP to user via SMS
C. Randomized LTOTP generation
Randomized LTOTP generation XORs the random number
generated by the logistic map and TOTP value calculated from
(8) to produce the final n-bit random number, which is further
rearranged randomly using LCG. This type of OTP generation
produces more randomness than existing solutions and facili-
tates time-critical authentication. Thus, the Randomized LTOTP
generation method improves the security in arming.
A LCG yields a sequence of pseudo-randomized numbers
calculated with a discontinuous piece wise linear equation.
Therefore, LCG can be used to randomly arrange the n-bit
random number obtained by XOR of TOTP and the output of
LCRNG (R). The XOR output of TOTP and R is represented
as RNG. This RNG is provided as input to LCG for further
randomization. Randomized LTOTP uses 4 bits per digit of
OTP; thus, for a four digit OTP, it needs 16 (4*4) bits. Thus,
the number of bits can be determined by n = 4 ∗ d, where d
is the number of digits required for OTP.
The LCG is defined mathematically by,
Yn+1 = (αYn + c) mod m (11)
where Y , α, c and Y0 represents the sequence of pseudo-
random numbers, multiplier, increment and initial value respec-
tively. The increment and multiplier values are taken randomly
to avoid repetition and period in modulo operation. The bits are
randomly arranged and stored in a n-bit array. The final n-bit
array is converted to d-digit OTP. The process of Randomized
LTOTP is summarized in Algorithm 2. The algorithm considers
n-bit output (R) from LCRNG and TOTP as input and generates
a randomized LTOTP for arming as output. In step 1, the
number of bits for OTP is calculated based on the number
of digits required for OTP (d). The LCG is iterated for n times
to shuffle the XORed value of LCRNG and TOTP. In steps 3
and 4, the increment (c) and multiplier (a) of LCG are taken
as random values. In step 5 and step 6, LCG shuffles the input
value and stores it in a n-bit array. Step 8 to 12 converts the
Fig. 1. Sequence Diagram of OTP based Arming of drone
bits into d-digit OTP. In step 13, Randomized LTOTP is sent
to the user via SMS.
The UAV is facilitated with a raspberry pi module interfaced
with Global System for Mobile communications module to
enable OTP communication with the user. When arming is
turned on, a randomized LTOTP is sent to the authorized user
by the UAV. The user enters the received OTP to arm the UAV.
If the OTP matches, then user can arm the UAV; otherwise, the
arming request is rejected. The process of authorized arming
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
IV. FLAG BASED BATTERY FAIL-SAFE MECHANISM
Even if a UAV mission succeeds in offline testing, there are
several reasons possible for a UAV to fail in completing the pre-
planned mission path. Such unsuccessful flight missions may
be due to unexpected levels of battery draining. To address the
aforementioned issue, battery limit or size can be increased.
However, this results in increased charging time and a reduction
in payload. Further, longer charging periods at stations impacts
consistent and productive flight missions. Thus, it might be
challenging to tap the effectiveness of the upgraded battery, and
therefore real-time missions are often planned with constrained
battery limits.
In existing fail-safe systems, during a mission, when the
battery level drops to low levels, the drone terminates the
mission and comes back to land, by triggering of Return To
Land (RTL) or LAND commands automatically. A Flag-based
Battery Fail-Safe (FBFS) system is proposed to monitor the
battery level at regular intervals throughout the mission and
alert the user if the voltage drops below a threshold. Every
time the battery goes below the specified threshold, a flag is
incremented. If the flag is raised more than 3 times, the drone
triggers the landing as the battery recovery chances are very
low; otherwise, the drone continues the mission.
Algorithm 3 Flag based Battery Fail-Safe Mechanism
Input: Drone IP to arm drone
Output: Drone take-off, Voltage check and landing of drone
1: Connect to the drone using IP of drone
2: Perform Basic pre-arm check and ensure safe take-off
3: while periodically monitoring battery and flag < 3 do
4: if battery voltage < 12.20 V and mode = AUTO then
5: Change mode to LAND
6: Increment flag
7: else if battery voltage > 12.20 V and mode = LAND
then
8: Change mode to AUTO
9: else
10: Continue the mission
11: end if
12: end while
Algorithm 3 summarizes the proposed FBFS mechanism for
UAVs based on the EFI engine. The Battery Fail-Safe algorithm
receives the drone IP as input, and the output is drone take-off
and landing control. In step 1 to step 2, the algorithm ensures
that the drone is armed and is in the mission. Step 3 ensures
that the drone’s battery level is monitored periodically, and fail-
safe flag is raised not more than 3 times. In step 4 to step 10,
the algorithm checks if the battery voltage stays above 12.20
V threshold, then the mission continues; otherwise, it triggers
LAND mode and the fail-safe flag is incremented once. If
the battery voltage regains more than 12.20 V intermittently
and if the mode is in LAND, the algorithm quickly switches
the drone back to AUTO mode to continue the mission.
Thus, the proposed battery fail-safe mechanism terminates the
mission only when the battery power has gone below the
threshold for more than 3 times. In other words, it prolongs the
mission through battery monitoring using the EFI framework
and facilitates safe landing.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The Randomized LTOTP algorithm and FBFS are imple-
mented using DroneKit-Python and ArduPilot simulator. In ad-
dition, the Randomized LTOTP authentication uses a Raspberry
Pi and GSM module for OTP communication with the user.
DroneKit-Python communicates with drones over Micro Air
Vehicle (MAV) Link, which enables programmatic access for
features like telemetry and telecommand. The drone travels in
the waypoints selected in the ArduPilot simulator.
The bifurcation diagram of the chaotic map implemented is
shown in Fig. 2. When r is less than 3, the value generated by
the logistic map is precise and stable. With r above 3, the values
generated fork into two discrete ways. For instance, At r =
3.2, the map values oscillate solely between two values: one
around 0.5 and the other around 0.8. Similarly, as r continues
to increase, the map values bifurcate even more. At r = 3.9, the
map has bifurcated so often that the generated values bounce
randomly. The system is completely unpredictable at r = 4,
which is the r value used in the implementation.






























Fig. 2. Bifurcation diagram of Logistic map
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Fig. 3. OTP Values Comparison for various OTP algorithms
The graph in Fig. 3 shows the OTP values generated using
the TOTP [9] algorithm, Randomized LTOTP algorithm and
Chaos-based Random Number Generation (Chaos-based RNG)
[8]. An analytical study called runs test is used to assess
the randomness of OTP generated by the algorithms. In the
runs test, the null hypothesis H0, specifies that the sequence
is in random manner and Ha is the alternative hypothesis.
In the statistical runs test, the p-value is the probability of
obtaining results as extreme randomness, assuming that the
null hypothesis is correct. A smaller p-value indicates stronger
evidence towards the alternative hypothesis. The p-value is
plotted for the OTP algorithms, as shown in Fig. 4. Thus, the
p-value of 0.9208 for Randomized LTOTP indicates that 92
out of 100 times the null hypothesis is true, which indicates
increased randomness of the proposed algorithm. For chaos-
based RNG algorithm [8], Enhanced Logistic Map (ELM)
[18], TOTP algorithm [9] and HOTP algorithm [9], the p-
value indicates that the randomness achieved out of 100 times
are as follows: 76, 55, 3 and 2 respectively. Consequently, it
is observed from these findings that the Randomized LTOTP
indicates the highest randomness among the algorithms. The
graph in Fig. 5 shows the drone flight time at low battery levels,
while triggering existing fail-safe and FBFS algorithm. From
the graph, it is observed that the FBFS extends the drone’s
flight time when compared to the existing fail-safe algorithm.
Thus, FBFS facilitates safe landing at low battery levels.
Randomized LTOTP Chaos-based RNG ELM TOTP HOTP

















Fig. 4. Randomness Comparison for various OTP algorithms



























Fig. 5. Flight time comparison between existing fail-safe and FBFS
VI. CONCLUSION
UAVs are sophisticated technology and used across a wide
range of applications. But, safety and security is still a concern
in the design of many UAV applications. In order to prevent
unauthorized arming, the proposed Randomized LTOTP mech-
anism uses a combination of logistic chaotic maps, TOTP, and
LCG to improve the randomness of the OTP and to enable time-
bound validity. The Randomized LTOTP mechanism provides
92% randomness and performs better when compared with
other existing authentication mechanisms, thereby improving
UAV security. To enhance the security of the Randomized
LTOTP mechanism, the generated OTP value is made valid
only for 30 seconds. To ensure the safety and reliability of
UAV applications, the proposed FBFS mechanism continuously
monitors the battery power and prevents unsafe landing of the
drone at lower battery levels.
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